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Due to the rapid growth in computer networks, most people nowadays have access
to the internet. This makes electronic voting a viable alternative to the classic paper
vote for governmental elections as well as small scale elections and surveys. However,
the use of electronic voting systems introduces new ways to systematically disrupt the
vote or falsify the result. If these systems are to replace the classical way of voting, the
communities that hold the elections, should be convinced of their correctness.
In present work we shall present a framework for validating the security properties of
electronic voting protocols and describe how this framework has been used to validate
four of the five security properties for three of the most well-known voting protocols;
FOO92, Sensus and E-Vox.
The work presented here was done as part of the work for achieving the master’s
degree as presented in the thesis by Esben Heltoft Andersen and Christoffer Rosenkilde
Nielsen [1]. Parts of work also appeared in the article Static Validation of a Voting
Protocol [6] which was recently presented in Lisbon, Portugal, at The Second Workshop
on Automated Reasoning for Security Protocol Analysis (ARSPA’05), one of the satellite
workshops of ICALP’05.
1 Design Goals of Electronic Voting Systems
In order to validate electronic voting protocols we need reasoning on the properties
they have to satisfy. In our work we focus on the security properties, hence we need to
identify what security properties a voting protocol should satisfy. It is important to note
that the security properties for electronic voting systems differ from those of ordinary
key-distribution protocols, and in [3] these security properties have been formalised into
four main properties:
◦ Verifiability: A system is verifiable if the voters independently can verify that
their votes have been counted correctly.
◦ Accuracy: The accuracy of a voting system is divided into three parts: (1) it is
not possible for a vote to be altered, (2) a validated vote cannot be eliminated from
the final tally and (3) an invalid vote cannot be counted in the final tally.
◦ Democracy: A system ensures democracy if (1) only eligible voters can vote and
(2) eligible voters can only vote once.
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◦ Privacy: In a voting system the privacy is obtained if nobody can link any vote
to the voter who cast it.
Often a fifth property is added [2, 5]:
◦ Fairness: No early results from the vote can be obtained.
The validation technique presented in our work covers four of these five properties; veri-
fiability, accuracy, democracy and fairness.
The study of proposed electronic voting protocols has revealed that security properties
are informally proved and argued to be satisfied. However, as security protocols are
notoriously difficult to design and analyse, techniques for formally validating the security
properties are particular important, which stresses the importance of present work.
2 Framework for Validation
To automatically validate voting protocols we need some sort of strategy and our
strategy is illustrated by the framework in Figure 1.
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Figure 1: Framework
In order to analyse a protocol, we need a mathematical model of the protocol instead
of the informal protocol narration. Hence we use process calculi to model the protocol,
and in particular we have chosen the process calculus LYSA.
In addition to a model of the protocol, we shall also model the environment in which
the protocol is evaluated. In the scenario we consider all communication is done on a
public channel; the ether. This model of the environment must be realistic with respect
to the actual behavior that could occur in such a network, and therefore is all malicious
behavior of the environment represented by an attacker model. This attacker is modeled
following the Dolev-Yao approach [4].
The validation of the protocol is then performed by applying an analysis to the math-
ematical model of the protocol and the attacker. The technique used for this validation
is known as program analysis [7].
The aim of program analysis is to approximate answers and in our case we look for
conservative answers; ie. over-approximations. An over-approximation possibly includes
behaviors of the program that can never occur in real-life, so if we study one specific be-
havior in the analysis result, we must be aware that it might be a false-positive. However,
the over-approximation will at least hold all behaviors of the program possible, so if the
analysis finds that the approximation does not violate any properties we can conclude
that these properties can never be violated.
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That the analysis ensures conservative answers is a result of it being semantics based ;
ie. the information obtained from the analysis can be proven sound with respect to the
semantics of the process calculi analysed.
3 Results
The contribution of our work is to the area of automated analysis of networking
systems. More specifically, we present a framework for automatically validating the
security properties of voting protocols. Our analysis covers four of the five security
properties for voting protocols, and as the analysis calculates an over-approximation of
the possible behavior of the protocols, we can be certain that the validation is sound.
We have used this framework to validate three voting protocols; the FOO92 voting
protocol, one of the most established voting protocols in the literature, the Sensus voting
protocol and the E-Vox voting protocol. Of these have, to the best of our knowledge,
only the FOO92 protocol been validated previously in the literature, and that was only
for some of the security properties.
Our initial analysis results for verifiability and accuracy pinpoint flaws in the FOO92
and the Sensus protocols: We have identified a denial of service attack which could force
the counter to repeatedly disqualify the voting process and we have identified a flaw which
allows the attacker to forge the publishing of votes. However for both of these protocols
we proposed an amendment, and the four security properties were subsequently validated
for the amended protocols.
The E-Vox protocol had a bit different design, and the above mentioned flaws are not
present in this protocol. However because of the protocol design, E-Vox cannot satisfy
fairness.
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